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In order to improve productivity and reduce costs, manufacturing firms use product 
families to provide variety while maintaining economies of scale. In a competitive 
marketplace, designing a successful product family requires considering both 
customer preferences and the actions of other firms. This dissertation will conduct 
fundamental research on how to design products and product families in the presence 
of competition. We consider both single product and product family design problems. 
We use game theory to construct a model that includes the competition’s product 
design decisions. We use separation, a problem decomposition approach, to replace 
complex optimization problems with simpler problems and find good solutions more 
efficiently. We study the well-known universal electric motor problem to demonstrate 
our approaches. This dissertation introduces the separation approach, optimizes 
product design with competition, models product family design under competition as 
a two-player zero-sum game, and models product family design with design and price 
competition as a two-player mixed-motive game.  This dissertation formulates novel 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Product Families 
A product family is a set of products that are derived from a platform. They share 
some common components which reduces the manufacturing cost of the products. 
Product families create greater variety for costumers and lead to higher profit for the 
manufacturers. Many manufacturers find product families more profitable due to 
lower manufacturing costs and higher sales in the market.  However designing 
product families may lead the designs to be constrained to the platform and sacrifices 
their performance if the optimal platform is not selected. For the mentioned reason 
designing product families can be a large, complex optimization problem with highly 
nonlinear objective functions which may not lead to optimum solution using current 
methods. In this research we separate these problems into simpler subproblems to 
solve these large, complex problems easier with less computational effort.  
1.2 Product Family Examples 
 Many of the products in the market share common components; Ford Motor 
Company produces the family of Taurus vehicles which share the same frame and 
body but different engines and some additional features in each product. A family of 
cordless drills that derive from the same platform based on their battery voltage. 
Other examples are aircrafts that share many common components which derive 
based on the number of passengers or freight capacity. Other examples can be ships, 
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locomotives and space shuttles. Intel delivers a family of central processing units to 
the market. 
1.3 Objectives 
The research, motivated by the study of design processes, advances in design 
optimization of single and product families, and design for market systems 
considering competition, makes contributions to these areas by answering the 
following research questions.  This dissertation uses two-player zero-sum games and 
two-player mixed motive games to model product family design optimization 
problems. The results have the potential to improve the practice of design and 
introduce new horizons to competitive product family design. 
1.3.1 Product Family Design 
 This research increases our understanding of how a firm can design a product 
family that can compete with another product family of another manufacturer. We 
will also show how a firm can maximize its product family sales by maximizing 
the products desirability regardless of what the other firm does. 
1.3.2 Design for Market Systems 
 This research uses game theory to consider how should a firm design and 
price a product in the presence of competition? This research studies single 
product and product family design. In particular, we investigate how a firm should 
design and price a new product when the other firm’s product design and price 
are not known and the competitor is simultaneously designing its product. 
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1.3.3 Design Optimization 
In many design problems there is a big issue of how can we solve the problem 
using a simpler, faster and more efficient way with less computational effort? 
This research gives a very good approach to replace large, complex optimization 
problems with simpler ones and enable the designer to solve the problem more 
efficiently. The research yields systematic and rigorous approaches to separation, 
including the analysis of exact and approximate separations.  The concept of 
separation and the analysis of exact and approximate separations provide a clear 
theoretical understanding of when a separation can yield a solution that is optimal 
for the original problem.  We also can understand how separation can help firms 
to find dominating strategies in order to compete with other firms in the market. 
1.3.4 Product Design Processes 
 This research helps designers to understand how optimization approaches 
such as separation can model a product design process and how separation in 
early stages of design process can help firms to make design decisions. Also using 
separation approach we can show which customer requirements in a product can 
lead to higher profit. 
1.4 Overview of Dissertation 
In this dissertation we introduce a new method to solve large, complex 
optimization problems. We try to use our approach to solve other market issues 
such as design in a competitive market and pricing. We first focus on proposing 
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our approach and how this approach helps designers to make engineering 
decisions in the conceptual design stage.  
In Chapter 1 we introduce product families, discuss their importance, and 
mention some examples.  In Chapter 2 we review some previous work in this 
area. In Chapter 3, we introduce the separation approach. Chapter 4 applies 
separation to the design of a single product (without considering competition).  
Chapter 5 applies separation to the design of a product family in the presence of 
competition, where the objective is to maximize sales.  We use a zero-sum game 
to model this problem. In Chapter 6, we design a single product while competition 
exists and different strategies lead to different profits gained by competitors. We 
then expand this example to the family of the products in Chapter 7 and show that 
designing a family of products has different profitability based on manufacturer’s 
strategy. Chapter 8 summarizes the research and presents some ideas for future 
work in this area. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Product Family 
A product family is a group of related products that is derived from a product 
platform to satisfy a variety of market niches. Many manufacturing firms develop 
product platforms and design families of products based on these platforms to provide 
variety while maintaining economies of scale to improve manufacturing productivity. 
In product family design, sharing components and production processes across a 
platform of products enables companies to develop differentiated products efficiently 
by reducing design costs, to increase the flexibility and responsiveness of their 
manufacturing processes, and to take market share away from competitors that 
develop only one product at a time. Other benefits include reduced development and 
production costs and an improved ability to upgrade products [1]. Using a product 
platform enables designers and manufacturers to upgrade the whole family of 
products at once by changing design values instead of changing each product 
individually. 
Designing product families requires aligning product, process and supply chain 
decisions [2].  Studies of product architecture, product variety, product positioning 
and product line design have increased our understanding of product family design 
[3].  One aspect that has not been studied yet is product family design in a 
competitive market, where the competition’s product family design decisions are not 
known when developing the product family. Shiau and Michalek [4] proposed an 
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approach to new product design entering the market while existing products are sold 
by competitors. 
Recently, Luo [5] studied the integration of engineering and marketing criteria in 
product family optimization and proposed an approach that iterates between the 
problem of setting design variable configurations to maximize profitability and the 
problem of adjusting wholesale and retail prices for the new product family and 
incumbent products. 
Ramdas and Sawhney [6] studied the problem of adding new products to an 
existing product family.  Their work considered both the revenue implications and the 
life-cycle cost implications of component sharing.  
D’Souza and Simpson [7] use a multiobjective genetic algorithm to optimize the 
performance of the products in the resulting family. They illustrate their approach on 
the design of a family of aircraft.  The objective function incorporates multiple 
attributes related to the cost and performance of the aircraft. 
Farrell and Simpson [8] consider the problem of finding the optimal product 
platform for a family of products.  They optimize product size (which relates to 
product cost) and illustrate their approach on a family of valve yokes. 
Heese and Swaminathan [9] consider a problem in which the manufacturer must 
set the price and quality levels of two products that are offered to two different 
market segments.  Their work does not consider the design variables or the actions of 
competitors. 
Jiao and Zhang [10] consider the impact that a product family has on operational 
costs and use a genetic algorithm to solve a mixed-integer combinatorial optimization 
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problem.  Their work considers different attribute levels but does not consider design 
variables or the actions of competitors. 
Recently, Kumar et al. [11] proposed the Market-Driven Product Family Design 
(MPFD) methodology, which integrates market considerations with product family 
design issues to design the most profitable product family.  The approach first creates 
a market segmentation grid, creates a demand model, builds models for product 
performance, and combines these models for product family optimization, including 
product positioning decisions. 
Li and Azarm [12] present a product family design approach that first generates 
design alternatives and then solves a product line design evaluation and selection 
problem.  Their work uses a genetic algorithm to solve the problem.  The objective 
function is to maximize the net present value of the total profits.  The problem 
includes a demand estimation model but does not consider the potential actions of 
competitors.  That is, the competition is known and fixed. 
2.2 Design for Market Systems 
Organizations that develop products and systems want to create the most 
desirable products in order to maximize their profit. Increasingly, customer needs 
play a critical role in designer’s decisions. The desirability of a product can be 
defined as meeting customer expectations in a product. Designers are trying to satisfy 
more customer requirements in a product in order to make their design more 
desirable.  
The decision-based design (DBD) framework [13] is an approach that 
explicitly addresses the challenge of creating the most profitable design.  It starts with 
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the assumption that engineering design is a decision-making process.  The framework 
shows that possible design alternatives should be evaluated based on how they affect 
the value of the product.  A typical bottom-line measurement of value is profit.  The 
framework also indicates that there are uncontrollable variables that affect the value 
of the product but notes that price is a controllable variable.  The framework thus 
shows that the design problem is to optimize the value of the profit (the expected 
utility of the profit) by selecting values for all of the design variables and the price. 
Optimization methods such as analytical target cascading [14] and collaborative 
optimization [15] have been proposed for solving this complex problem.  The 
influence of retailer decisions on sales has been studied as well [16]. 
The study of product design has considered two types of market competition: 
price competition (which has the potential to affect sales in the short-term because 
prices can be changed quickly) and design competition (which requires more time to 
affect sales due to the lead time of developing a new product).  Previous work has 
addressed the problems of designing a single product when the competitor’s price 
decision is unknown [17], product positioning and pricing when a dominant retailer 
must be considered [18], and optimizing a product design while considering the 
likelihood of retailer acceptance [16].  The spatial pricing problem has been 
addressed with two-stage approaches that first choose locations in which to sell the 
product and then select prices for each location [19-25]. 
Impact of the subjective characteristics on consumer’s product preference has 
been studied using hierarchical Bayesian structural equation model has been proposed 
to incorporate such impact into the selection of optimal product design [23]. 
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Williams et al. [24] looked at bundling across different product categories, but 
this is outside the scope of the product families considered in this dissertation. 
Although previous work [25] proposed approaches such as Selection-
Integrated Optimization (SIO) to optimize product family design with respect to the 
selection of platform and non-platform design variables, no previous work used game 
theory to consider market competition in the design of products and product families.  
Some of the recent work mentioned in Section 2.1 has, like this dissertation, 
considered both marketing and engineering models in the optimization of product 
families. 
2.3 Optimization 
Organizations that develop products and systems want to create the most valuable 
design that is feasible. The measurement of value, which depends upon the type of 
organization, may be profitability, life-cycle cost, or system effectiveness, for 
example.  The value of the product or system that is being designed depends upon the 
decisions that the design engineer (or development team) makes.   
The observation that engineering design requires making decisions has motivated 
a great deal of research, including work on decision analysis, decision theory, concept 
generation, modeling customer demand, multi-attribute decision-making, enterprise 
models, product development processes, and decentralized decision-making [26]. 
Design organizations can be viewed as a set of loosely-coupled decision-makers [27] 
that generate and share information in order to generate designs [28, 29]. The ultimate 
goal is to improve the quality of these decisions and increase the value of product 
development processes [30].  
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A variety of decision-making processes have been identified [31]. The two that 
are most relevant to engineering design are the incremental decision process model 
and optimization.  The incremental decision process model [32] presents a structure 
in which a major decision is implemented as a series of small decisions. This detailed 
model involves iterating between the following types of activities: recognition, 
diagnosis, search, screen, design, judgment, analysis, bargaining, and authorization.  
Designers will easily recognize the similarities between this process and their own 
activities. 
Design optimization is an important engineering design activity and a difficult 
mathematical problem.  In general, design optimization determines values for design 
variables such that an objective function is optimized while performance and other 
constraints are satisfied [33, 34, 35]. Formal design optimization is a useful decision-
making process when two conditions hold: (1) there exists enough technical 
knowledge to formulate a mathematical model that can express the value of a design 
as a mathematical function of the design variables and (2) there is a consensus on the 
appropriate objective function [31]. The attributes used to describe a design 
optimization model can be grouped into four areas: scope, variable set, objective 
function, and model structure [36].   
The difficulty of solving large scale optimization problems and multidisciplinary 
optimization (MDO) problems has motivated various decomposition approaches.  In 
general, these decomposition approaches require multiple iterations to converge to a 
feasible, optimal solution for a given design optimization model.  Model coordination 
and goal coordination are two common methods for the decomposition of large scale 
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design optimization problems [37, 38]. MDO problems have been the focus of 
decomposition approaches such as the bi-level integrated system synthesis (BLISS) 
approach [39], analytical target cascading [40, 41], collaborative optimization [42], 
and coupled subspace optimization (CSSO) [43, 44]. Yoshimura et al. [45] 
decompose a multi-objective optimization problem into a hierarchy of problems that 
have two objectives. 
The decision-based design (DBD) framework [13] is an approach that explicitly 
addresses the challenge of creating the most profitable design.  It starts with the 
assumption that engineering design is a decision-making process.  The framework 
shows that possible design alternatives should be evaluated based on how they affect 
the value of the product.  As mentioned above, a typical bottom-line measurement of 
value is profit.  The framework also indicates that there are uncontrollable variables 
that affect the value of the product but notes that price is a controllable variable.  The 
framework thus shows that the design problem is to optimize the value of the profit 
(the expected utility of the profit) by selecting values for all of the design variables 
and the price.  The comprehensive nature of the DBD framework has inspired 
researchers to develop new design optimization models (called enterprise models) 
that add variables from the marketing and manufacturing domains to models with 
conceptual design variables and to adapt existing decomposition techniques to solve 
them [16, 45, 46].  These more extensive design optimization problems reflect the 
natural desire to handle large, complex problems in an integrated way [47].   
This dissertation introduces an approach that replaces a design optimization 
problem with a set of subproblems to form a decision-based design process.  In 
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particular, this section analyzes a version of the DBD framework, identifies 
conditions under which the separation is exact (the result is optimal), presents 
sufficient conditions for establishing bounds on the quality of a non-optimal solution, 
and applies the concept to a specific engineering design problem.   
2.4 Game Theory 
Game theory is the theory of independent and interdependent decision making. It 
is concerned with decision making in organizations where the outcome depends on 
the decisions of two or more autonomous players, one of which may be nature itself, 
and where no single decision maker has full control [48].  There are many types of 
games that represent interactions of players, but in this research we consider only two 
types of games.  
The first type is the zero-sum game in which the sum of the payoffs is constant. In 
this type of game, as one player’s payoff increases, the other player’s payoff 
decreases by an equal amount. Matching pennies is a well-known example of a two 
player zero-sum game. In this game, each of the players flips a coin. If the coins came 
up matching (both heads or both tails) then one player (the matcher) wins, so the 
other players (the mismatcher) pays $1 to the matcher. Thus, the matcher gains $1, 
and the mismatcher loses $1.  If the coins don’t match (one head and one tail), then 
the mismatcher wins, and the matcher pays $1 to the mismatcher. Thus, the 
mismatcher gains $1, and the matcher loses $1.  The gain of one player exactly equals 
the loss of the other.  Some strategies may be dominated by others; in this case a 
player should not choose the dominated strategies because they cannot be optimal.  In 
general, it is optimal to choose a strategy that has the best worst-case outcome [48].  
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The second type of game that we consider in this research is the mixed-motive 
game, in which the sum of the payoffs can change from strategy to strategy. Again, 
some strategies may be dominated and should not be chosen.  In general, the optimal 
solution is to find a Nash Equilibrium point from which none of the players want to 
deviate [48]. An example of a mixed-motive game is shown in the following table in 
which the sum of the outcomes of each player changes from one strategy to another.  
Each ordered pair is the payoff for Player 1 and the payoff for Player 2.  For example, 
if Player 1 chooses A and Player 2 chooses C, then Player 1’s payoff is 5, and Player 
2’s payoff is 4. 
Table 1: Example of a Mixed-Motive Game. 
Strategy Player 2: C Player 2: D 
Player 1: A 5,4 3,2 
Player 1: B 4,1 1,6 
 
In the above game Player 1’s best outcome is 5, and Player 2’s best outcome is 6. 
For Player 1, choosing A dominates choosing B because the payoffs for A are greater, 
no matter what Player 2 does.  A Nash Equilibrium is the strategy combination (A, 
C), which has payoff (5,4).  Although it is not the best outcome for Player 2, he has 
no incentive to change his strategy to D, which would reduce his payoff. 
Game theory has been used previously to represent decision-making in design 
processes, with the players in the game representing different designers (within the 
same organization) who control different sets of design variables and may have 
different objectives [48-57].  For example, to design a pressure vessel, Lewis and 
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Mistree [52] formulated the problem as a two player game in which the first player, 
who wishes to maximize the volume, controls the diameter and length and the second 
player, who wishes to minimize the weight, controls the thickness.  Chen and Simon 
[56] used game theory to model various team interactions in concurrent parametric 
design. 
Absent from the work cited here is the problem of designing (and pricing) a 
product when the competition is simultaneously designing (and pricing) its product. 
In Michalek et al. [58], maximizing profit with respect to the design variables of each 
producer is considered separately while treating each competitor decisions as 
constant. The optimization approach iterates among all producers until all producers 
converge to their final design. Choi et al. [59] modeled price decision models in 
which firms choose their optimal price independently until no firm wants to alter its 
product strategy and proposed numerical methods to product positioning decision 
models. Shiau and Michalek [17] proposed an approach to new product design 
entering the market while existing products are sold by competitors. They assumed 
that all competitors have their price decisions with known product attributes and 
costs. In a later study [60], they considered the competition of firms in consumer 
choice as well as channel structures. 
2.4 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the relevant literature on the design of product families 
and the emerging area of design for market systems, which explicitly considers 
pricing and market competition during the design of a product.  This chapter has also 
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reviewed works on design optimization, the concepts of game theory, and their 
application in engineering design research.   
Despite the great interest in designing product families and design for market 
systems for single products, absent from the work cited here is the problem of 
designing a product (or product family) when the competition is simultaneously 
designing its product (or product family).  Game theory is a useful approach to model 
competition in the market, but it has not been applied to these types of problems.   
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Chapter 3: Separating Product Design Optimization 
This chapter presents a new approach for solving large, complex optimization 
problems.  This general approach will be used to find solutions to the product design 
and product family design problems considered in this dissertation.  This chapter 
provides an overview of the approach. 
3.1 Definition of Separation 
In this section we describe an approach that replaces a design optimization 
problem with a set of subproblems, solves each subproblem once, and produces a 
feasible solution without iterative cycles.  We call this approach separation.  The ideal 
separation produces an optimal solution to the original problem.  However, not all 
separations do. 
Separation is a type of problem decomposition. Separation is similar (but not 
identical) to decomposition-based design optimization.  Both replace a large design 
optimization problem with a set of subproblems.  In a typical decomposition 
approach, a second-level problem must be solved to coordinate the subproblem 






Figure 1. (a) A typical decomposition scheme has multiple first-level subproblems (P1, P2, P3) 
that receive inputs from a second-level problem (P*), which also coordinates their solutions.   
(b) Separation yields a set of subproblems.  Solving one provides the input to the next. 
 
Separation, on the other hand, does not require subsequent coordination.  It is a 
decentralized and sequential approach related to the concept that is called 
“factorization” in Pahl and Beitz [64].  A large problem is divided into subproblems.  
The solution to one subproblem will provide the inputs to one or more subsequent 
subproblems.  However, there is no higher-level problem to coordinate the solution.  
Note that the separation does not have to be a simple sequence of subproblems; it 
may have subproblems that are solved in parallel at places.  A given separation 
specifies a partial order in which the subproblems are solved.  A different order of 
subproblems would be a different separation and would lead to a different solution.  
(Examples of this phenomenon can be found in work on sequential design decision-
making [15].) 
The subproblems’ objective functions are surrogates for the original problem’s 
objective function.  These surrogates come from substituting simpler performance 
measures that are correlated with the original one, eliminating components that are 
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not relevant to that subproblem, or from removing variables that will be determined in 
another subproblem. 
Although it is a unique approach, separation shares some concepts and 
characteristics with other optimization techniques.  The similarities reflect the shared 
strategy of dividing a large problem into smaller parts, a common approach in 
decision-making and optimization.   
As mentioned above, separation replaces a large optimization problem with a set 
of smaller ones, like other decomposition approaches do.  A key distinctive feature of 
separation is that, unlike the multiple-discipline-feasible (MDF) and individual-
discipline-feasible (IDF) techniques [65-67] or concurrent subspace optimization [43, 
44], separation does not iterate until the solution converges.  Moreover, the 
subproblems in a separation do not have to correspond strictly to different disciplines.   
The decentralized design that characterizes separation is also discussed by 
Chanron and Lewis [68], who applied concepts from game theory to study the 
convergence of various iterative approaches.  By contrast, separation does not include 
iteration, as mentioned above.  Moreover, separation allows one to allocate the design 
variables to different designers and to dictate their objective functions, instead of 
taking those as given, as the game theory approach does.  
Like dynamic programming, separation may solve a set of subproblems and use 
the solution of one problem to solve another.  Typically dynamic programming 
recursively solves a set of subproblems (corresponding to a set of possible states) 
starting with a trivial subproblem [68].  By contrast, separation does not contain this 
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special recursive structure; therefore, solving a subproblem considers only the 
decisions that have been made. 
Goal programming [70] prioritizes a set of criteria and finds a solution that meets 
as many high-priority goals as possible.  This approach to multicriteria decision-
making uses a single optimization problem that includes all the criteria.  Separation, 
on the other hand, replaces a problem that has one (possibly complex) objective with 
subproblems that have different objectives.  Some separations may resemble goal 
programming formulations.  In general, however, the ordering of subproblems in a 
separation does not necessarily reflect the importance of their objectives. 
Also, despite the similar name, separation is not the same as separable 
programming, a branch of mathematical programming that concerns nonlinear 
optimization problems in which the objective function and the constraints are sums of 
single-variable functions [73].  Separable programming approaches use a linear 
program to approximate the original problem and employ a type of simplex algorithm 
to find a solution.  By contrast, separation replaces the original problem with a set of 
subproblems. 
3.1.1 Definition of Exact and Approximate Separation 
An exact separation is a separation such that finding an optimal solution for each 
subproblem leads to an optimal solution to the original design optimization problem.  
If optimal solutions to the subproblems cannot be found, the result may not be an 
optimal solution to the original design optimization problem. 
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An approximate separation is a separation such that finding an optimal solution 
for each subproblem does not lead to an optimal solution to the original design 
optimization problem.  
3.1.2 Separation Example 
We demonstrate our approach with the following simple problem and then solve 
several problems throughout the dissertation. 
Suppose that we have the following simple objective function, which we seek to 
minimize: 
  (1) 
Table 2 shows lower and upper bounds for the variables.  
Table 2: Bounds on Design Variables. 




 1 10 
 1 10 
 
We can separate the problem into different subproblems. In the first separation, 
instead of minimizing  we first minimize the surrogate function of  to get a 
value for and then optimize  to get a value for . Results are shown in the 
following table. 
In the second separation, instead of minimizing , we first minimize  
and then optimize .  
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Third separation includes minimizing  and  at the same time to get 
values of  and  in order to minimize . 
 
Table 3: Optimum Design Values in Different Separations. 
 




AAO 1 10 2.8183 - 
S1 1 10 2.8183 0 
S2 1 10 2.8183 0 
S3 1 10 2.8183 0 
 
In this example all of the separations lead to an exact solution for the original 
problem.  This is not always the case, however. 
3.2 Separating Design Optimization Problems 
Separating a design optimization problem is a modeling task that requires 
understanding the relationships between the design variables, constraints, and 
objective function.  Forming a separation includes identifying the design variables, 
constraints, and objectives for the subproblems.  Although optimization techniques 
exist for solving the subproblems, there are no automated methods for forming a 
separation. 
Certain natural approaches can be identified.  If the problem has a hierarchical 
structure, the separation can exploit that.  Candidate subproblems include those that 
optimize intermediate values and functions of design variables that are (as a set) 
independent of other design variables.  A separation can first set targets for 
intermediate values and then set values for design variables to meet these targets.  
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Alternatively, a separation can set design variables first, using a surrogate objective 
function that is correlated to the ultimate objective function.   
Defining surrogate objectives and appropriate constraints may require additional 
analysis combined with knowledge (based on experience) about which issues are the 
most important ones and which solutions are usually poor ones.  Subproblems that 
correspond to different engineering disciplines or engineering tasks (as mentioned by 
[43]) may be useful.  However, it is important to note that the subproblems do not 
necessarily have to correspond to different engineering disciplines.  For highly 
coupled systems, the use of global sensitivity equations [75] may help identify 
appropriate subproblems and surrogate objectives.  One could find a separation by 
applying techniques developed for decomposition approaches that rearrange the 
constraint-parameter incidence matrix formed by the design variables and the 
constraints [75-76] or the adjacency matrix of the analysis functions and the design 
variables [77].  Other relevant approaches include using the information gathered 
during Quality Function Deployment to identify the key design variables [80] and 
using the value of information to identify simplifications [81].  
Engineering design optimization problems for a single product or a family of 
products with or without competition can be separated using our approach, as the 
results in this dissertation show. In particular, it is possible to separate problems in 
which profit is a function of customer attributes (product performance), which are in 
turn functions of the design variables.  The separations reflect the structure of the 
coupling between the variables, attributes, and objective function.  The separations in 
Chapter 3 illustrate possible separations for these types of problems.  In order to 
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separate a product design profit maximization problem; we use intermediate variables 
to obtain design variables and price to find a feasible solution.  
Design optimization problems with competition can be formulated as two-player 
games.  Although each player’s decisions affect the other player as well, the 
interactions are limited to a few key variables, so formulating subproblems for each 
player creates an effective separation.  The analysis of dominance properties also 
leads to effective separations, as shown in Chapter 6. 
Problems without these intermediate variables and functions (and without 
multiple players) are among the problems that cannot be separated effectively. That 
is, if all of the variables in the problem are tightly coupled, any attempted separation 
is unlikely to generate a feasible, near-optimal solution. 
3.3 Handling Uncertainty 
As we know there are two sources of uncertainty in the design process: (1) 
aleatory uncertainty and (2) epistemic uncertainty. Many methods such as Reliability 
Based Design Optimization (RBDO) have been created to handle uncertainty in the 
design problems. One common approach in most of these methods is to choose a 
confidence level, and, based on that, we force the search process to explore only those 
solutions in the design space that are feasible with respect to that confidence level. 
That is, the confidence level or reliability factor can be added as an additional 
constraint to the problem, and every solution must satisfy this constraint. 
Separations of these types of problems must use appropriate subproblems that 
also include the confidence level (or reliability factor) in their constraints.  If these 
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constraints introduce additional coupling to the problem, then it will be more difficult 
to find effective separations. 
3.4 Summary 
This chapter introduced our approach, that we call separation, to solve large, 
complex optimization problems. We then discussed some approaches to form a 
separation and identifying subproblems. The chapter also discussed how to handle 
uncertainty and design for reliability. 
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Chapter 4: Separating Design Optimization Problems into 
Decision-Based Design Processes  
4.1 Separating the DBD Framework 
We now consider a modified version of the DBD framework [13].  (This version 
ignores any uncertainties, and the demand affects the manufacturer’s total lifecycle 
cost.)  First, we will define the following notation: 
m = system configuration. 
M = the set of all possible configurations. 
x = vector of design variables.  
X(m) is the set of designs that are feasible for a given configuration m. 
p = selling price per unit. 
a = vector of product attributes. 
D = total demand over the product lifecycle (units). 
C = lifecycle cost to manufacturer. 
Π = total profit over the product lifecycle ($). 
The following functions are given: 
a(x) relates the attributes to the design variables. 
D = q(a, p) relates the demand to the attributes and the price. 
C(x, D) relates the lifecycle cost to the design variables and the demand. 
u(Π) = utility of profit.  We assume that u is monotonically increasing. 




    (1) 
We will separate P into two subproblems, P1 and P2.  We will use a graph-like 
figure to represent a separation.  This decision network figure has nodes that 
correspond to subproblems.  An arc from a subproblem node indicates the variables 
whose values are determined by that subproblem.  An arc leading into a node 
indicates the variables whose values are required by that subproblem.  The decision 
networks corresponding to the original formulation and the separation are shown in 
Figure 2.   
 
Figure 2. (a) The decision network for the integrated design optimization model. (b) The decision 
network for the separation. 
 
The variables in P1, the first subproblem in our separation, are a, the vector of 
attributes, and the price p.  Formulating this subproblem requires defining A, the set 
of all feasible attribute combinations.  (A vector of attribute values, sometimes called 
“targets,” is feasible if and only if there is some feasible combination of design 
variable values that can achieve all of those attributes simultaneously.)  It also 
requires defining , the approximate life cycle cost if the demand is D and the 
product attributes are a.  Then, we can let the approximate profitability  be the 
surrogate objective function: 
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    (2) 
Solving P1 provides a solution with values a* and p* and also 
yields . 
   (3) 
The variables in P2 are m and x.  Solving P2 yields the optimal values  
and : 
   (4) 
The quality of this separation is determined by the set A and the approximation 
.  Let A(m) be the set of attribute combinations that are feasible for a given 
configuration m in M: 
   (5) 
If  and  , then this is an exact 
separation.  To show this, we need to show that m*, x*, and p* are an optimal 
solution to Problem P.  (The proof that this separation is exact is similar to the 
analysis of a Stackelberg leader-follower game.) 
Suppose not.  Then there exists  and  and  such that 
, , and . 
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Because u is monotonically increasing, .  
Because m* and x* are an optimal solution for P2, we know that 
.   
Because  and , we know that 
.  Therefore, 
   (6) 
This contradicts the optimality (from P1) of a*, p*.  Therefore, m*, x*, and p* are 
an optimal solution to Problem P. QED. 
Having identified sufficient conditions for an exact separation, we now consider 
an approximate separation.  Suppose that the cost function  is not exact, but we 
have the following error bound: 
    (7) 
Then we can show that the profitability of m*, x*, and p* must be within 2ε of the 
optimal profitability as follows.  First, let  and  and  be an 
optimal solution to P.  Let  and .  Because m* and x* are an 
optimal solution for P2, we know that . 
From this equality, Equation (7), and some rearranging, we have the following: 
   (8) 
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We also know that .  From Equation (7) 
we know that .  Combining these and 
rearranging terms lead to the following: 
    (9) 
Because a* and p* are an optimal solution to P1, we know the following: 
    (10) 
Combining Equations (8), (9), and (10) yields the desired result, which shows that 
the profitability of m*, x*, and p* is close to the optimal profitability: 
     (11) 
The analysis shows that the quality of this separation depends upon the marketing 
group’s ability to identify feasible attribute combinations and to estimate costs.  If 
marketing selects an infeasible attribute combination, then it will be impossible to 
design a satisfactory product.  If the cost estimates are inaccurate, then the resulting 
product will be suboptimal.   
4.2 Example: Motor Design 
A universal electric motor example originally developed by Simpson [80] will be 
used to demonstrate the concept of separation.  Simpson used this example to 
demonstrate new techniques in product family design.  The following example 
ignores the product family aspect and deals with only a single motor design that 
should meet given power and torque requirements. 
30 
  
The optimization model for the universal electric motor problem includes nine 
variables (eight design variables and the price), four customer attributes, twenty-three 
intermediate engineering attributes, and seven fixed engineering parameters.  Table 4 
lists the design variables, their lower and upper bounds, and units.  The price  is in 
dollars.   








Turns of wire 
(armature) 
100 1500 turns 
 
Turns of wire 
(stator), per pole 




of armature wire 




of stator wire 








0.0005 0.01 m 
 Electric current 0.1 6 A 
 Stack length 0.01 0.2 m 
 
Appendix A describes the engineering parameters and engineering attributes.  The 
derivations of the equations and other background information on universal electric 
motors can be found in [80, 81].  The four customer attributes are the torque  (in 
Nm), the power  (in watts), the efficiency , and the mass  (in kg).  They are 
calculated from the design variables and the engineering attributes as follows: 
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     (12) 
As in Simpson et al. [81] we take as given two targets for the power and torque: 
W and Nm.  There is also a constraint due to the geometry of the 
motor: 
   (13) 
The cost equations were originally derived in Wassenaar and Chen [83].  We 
simplified the equations slightly.  The design cost  is assumed to be fixed at 
$500,000 while the material cost , labor cost , and capacity cost  vary with 
demand and engineering attributes.  (Due to inefficiencies, the capacity cost increases 
quadratically when the production quantity deviates from the optimal production 
capacity.) 
    (14) 
To predict demand, we used discrete choice analysis (DC) and spline functions 
that we created to model customer preference.  The total demand (d) is the population 
size (s) multiplied by the probability that a consumer will select a particular design 
(i.e. estimated market share).  We set s = 1,000,000.  The following equation shows 
the common DCA equations developed in [84, 85].   
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    (15) 
The attraction value ν is calculated from the following spline functions for the 
mass, efficiency, power, torque, and price: 
    (16) 
The profit Π of a motor design is a function of the demand (d), price (p), and the 
costs discussed above.   
   (17) 
This formulation is related to the notation of Section 4 as follows.  The set of 
configurations has only one element, so the configuration is given.  The set X(m) is 
defined by the upper and lower bounds, the engineering attributes, and the geometry 
constraint shown in Equation (13).  The attributes are the torque, power, efficiency, 
and mass.  The demand function q(a, p) is determined by the spline functions and the 
demand functions in Equations (15) and (16).  The cost function C(x, D) is 
determined by the sum of the costs described by Equation (14).  Finally, the utility 
u(Π) = Π. 
We conducted numerical tests using different separations of the motor design 
problem in order to compare their solution quality to the solutions found by solving 
all-at-once formulations of the problem.  (Note that one could consider the all-at-once 
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formulations as “trivial” separations.)  The decision networks corresponding to the 
formulations and separations are shown in Figure 3.   
The first formulation (A1) is an all-at-once formulation that determines values for 
the design variables and price in order to maximize profit.  Note that the terms  




Figure 3. Decision networks (x = the vector of design variables).  (a) The all-at-once formulations 
(a1 and a2) maximize profit. (b) Separation s1 finds the most profitable attribute values and 
price and then sets the design variables to satisfy them.  (c) Separation s2 finds the best design 
and then sets the price to maximize profit. 
 
The second formulation (A2) is an all-at-once formulation that determines values for 
the design variables and price in order to maximize profit while enforcing the power 
and torque requirements (by including them as equality constraints). 
Our first separation (S1) has two subproblems, like the one analyzed in Section 4.  
The first subproblem determines values for the mass, efficiency, and price in order to 
maximize profit while enforcing the power and torque requirements.  This 
subproblem requires a surrogate cost function that relates the total cost to the 
customer attributes (power, torque, mass, and efficiency) and price.  The first key 
issue is the material cost, which is a function of the three components’ masses, which 
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are not available in this subproblem.  Therefore, in the objective function, we replace 
 with , where  is some “average” material cost.  Other surrogate cost 
functions might be possible.   
The relationship between mass and efficiency is another important issue.  Not all 
combinations of values for mass and efficiency are feasible; in general, a higher 
efficiency motor will require more mass.  Creating a surrogate constraint for first 
subproblem in S1 is important to finding a practical solution (one that can be realized) 
and is critical to employing this particular separation.  We will consider two different 
surrogate constraints in our experimental results.   
After solving the first subproblem in S1, we need to determine values for the eight 
design variables in order to minimize the deviation from the four attribute targets 
( , ,  and ).  We can immediately satisfy the efficiency target 
by setting the current equal to the value .  The second subproblem in 
S1 then finds values for the other seven design variables in order to minimize a 
deviation (or loss) function Δ that includes deviations from a target total resistance, 
the target torque, and the target mass.  Achieving these three targets will satisfy all 
four customer attribute targets. 
   (18) 
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The second separation (S2) also has two subproblems.  The first subproblem in S2 
determines values for the eight design variables while satisfying the power and torque 
requirements.  Different versions of this subproblem use different objective functions, 
including minimizing mass, maximizing efficiency, and minimizing material cost.  
Given values for the design variables, which set the four customer attributes, the 
second subproblem in S2 determines the price in order to maximize profit.   
4.3 Experimental Results 
As mentioned above, the purpose of the numerical experiment was to compare the 
quality of the solutions that the separations generate to those of the all-at-once 
formulations and to get some insight into the computational effort.  All of the 
optimization problems were solved using the fmincon function in the MATLAB 
optimization toolbox.  Ten initial designs (listed in Appendix B) were found by 
solving the second subproblem in S1 for ten different randomly-generated 
combinations of the four customer attributes (power, torque, efficiency, and mass).   
For separation S1, we considered four scenarios formed by combining two 
different sets of surrogate constraints with two values for average material cost.  The 
average material cost  was set to $1.5 per kilogram and $2 per kilogram.  (Note that 
both values are between the parameters  and .)  The first set of surrogate 
constraints (CS1) had the following equations: 
   (19) 
The second set of surrogate constraints (CS2) had the following equations: 
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                                             (20) 
Note that these constraints were added because not all combinations of mass and 
efficiency can be achieved by feasible values on the design variables.  These 
constraints makes it easier to solve the design subproblem (which must meet these 
targets). 
Tables 5, 6, and 7 show the experimental results for each separation.  (Because 
the subproblems have locally optimal solutions, we solved them with multiple initial 
points and report the best solution that was found.)  The profit of the solution to A1 is 
slightly higher than the profit of the A2 solution (which is taken as the benchmark), 
but the A1 solution ( = 315 W and  = 0.0472 Nm) also misses the power and 
torque targets.  The A2 formulation requires many more iterations.  The quality of the 
solution found by separation S1 depends greatly upon the surrogate constraint set.  
The best solution is found using CS2, which allows mass to become smaller (which is 
desirable) and thus includes more of the solution space.  Of course, it takes more 
effort to search this larger space.  Changing the average material cost does not affect 
the solution quality as much.  Separation S2 shows that, in this case, designs that 
maximize efficiency (one solution reached nearly 96%) are not as profitable as 
designs that minimize the material cost or the mass (which are closely related).  Note 
that the high-efficiency solution has a very large mass, which increases costs and 
reduces profit significantly compared to the low-mass and low-cost designs. 
Considering separation S1 in light of the results in Section 4, we note that the 
constraint sets do not include all of the feasible attribute combinations; indeed, some 
more profitable combinations are left out.  (That is, the set A is incomplete.)  
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Moreover, using a simpler material cost function ( ) introduces an 
approximation in the surrogate objective function .  Thus, this separation does not 
satisfy the conditions for an exact separation.  In the worst case (when the stator and 
armature have a mass of 4.5 kg, the windings have no mass, the efficiency equals 
0.96, and the price equals 0 to increase demand), the difference between  and  
is over $2,980,000.  For the best solution found for formulation A1, when  = $1.5 
per kilogram, the difference between  and  is only $23,082. 










A1  579 4,000,518 0.29 
A2 
P = 300,  
T = 0.05 
65037 3,989,027 - 
CS1, 
 = 1.5 
181 3,317,975 16.82 
CS1, 
 = 2 
168 3,580,730 10.24 
CS2, 
 = 1.5 




306 3,935,521 1.34 
Max Efficiency 312 3,040,692 23.77 
Min Cost 554 3,379,202 15.29 S2 




Table 6: Best design found in each formulation and separation 
     
A1 610.6097 285.0453 0.184783 0.184783 
A2 655.1343 305.7057 0.180135 0.018042 
S1.1 971.5219 56.1535 0.247552 0.094276 
S1.2 483.5268 223.3108 1.0000 0.054794 
S1.3 391.2846 234.6498 0.235729 0.153379 
S1.4 377.6240 177.9033 0.167358 0.172152 
S2.1 1280.116 385.2213 0.902201 1.0000 
S2.2 374.4015 144.2613 0.042322 0.042731 
S2.3 375.9264 143.2410 0.045773 0.039134 
 
      
A1 0.0100 0.004451 3.184614 0.0100 9.09 
A2 0.0100 0.004445 3.054586 0.0100 9.08 
S1.1 0.015036 0.0100 3.394331 0.032943 8.42 
S1.2 0.018205 0.0100 3.483778 0.0100 8.41 
S1.3 0.011727 0.003904 3.056057 0.015274 9.03 
S1.4 0.010499 0.001617 3.101400 0.018867 9.01 
S2.1 0.010704 0.007590 2.729624 0.0100 8.83 
S2.2 0.0100 0.004645 6.0000 0.0100 7.78 
S2.3 0.0100 0.004630 6.0000 0.0100 7.78 
Table 7: Attributes of best design found in each formulation and separation 
     
A1 0.0472 315 0.8608 0.1026 
A2 0.05 300 0.8540 0.1063 
S1.1 0.05 300 0.7686 0.3661 
S1.2 0.05 300 0.7498 0.3074 
S1.3 0.05 300 0.8536 0.1366 
S1.4 0.05 300 0.8411 0.1259 
S2.1 0.05 300 0.9557 0.5583 
S2.2 0.05 300 0.4348 0.0330 
S2.3 0.05 300 0.4348 0.0331 
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4.4 Discussion: Engineering Design Process 
The results above show that a design optimization problem can be replaced by a 
set of subproblems.  We now turn to engineering design processes.  Separation 
provides a perspective in which engineering design processes can be considered as 
heuristics for the problem of finding the most valuable design.  From this perspective, 
separation is a model for a certain class of engineering design processes. 
We will use the term progressive design process to describe an engineering 
design process that creates a product or system design through a series of distinct 
phases.  (Thus, this term would not cover prototype-based design processes that 
iterate through generate-build-test cycles.)  The phases generate intermediate results 
by making decisions about different aspects of the design and generating increasingly 
detailed information.  (The name reflects the similarity to a progressive die, which 
makes an increasingly complex part through a series of punches.)  Pahl and Beitz 
[64], Asimow [86], Ullman [87], and Ulrich and Eppinger [89] are among those 
presenting progressive design processes.   
Progressive design processes emphasize the movement from one phase to another 
and the intermediate results that are generated.  A progressive design process can be 
viewed as a heuristic for the value optimization problem discussed at the opening of 
this section.  For instance, if we consider the design process presented by Pahl and 
Beitz [64], one part of the process is described as optimizing the principle (or 
concept); another optimizes the layout, form, and material; and another optimizes the 
production.  Moreover, the process is based on a general problem-solving process and 
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ends with a “solution.”  It seems clear that the entire process is concerned with 
finding a feasible and valuable system design, even if optimality is not guaranteed.  
Previous research has developed models of design processes that focus on the 
activities that need to be done, as in Gantt charts, the PERT and critical path methods, 
IDEF, the design structure matrix, Petri nets, and signposting [90].  Such models have 
been used to estimate the cost and duration of design processes [91-94].  The 
approach taken in this section provides a way to consider the quality of the design 
process: how good is the solution that it creates?  Answering this question would 
seem to be a way to extend the principles of decision-based design (including the idea 
that design should find the most valuable product) from a single decision to a design 
process. 
This dissertation has presented two ways to evaluate the quality of a progressive 
design process by modeling it as a separation of a design optimization problem.  The 
separation of the DBD framework corresponds to a simple design process in which 
marketing experts determine the product’s price and the attribute values that the 
product should have; then the engineers have to find the lowest cost design that can 
meet these targets.  Moreover, it indicates mathematically that a progressive design 
process is a reasonable way to design a product or system, provided that the 
subproblems are appropriately formulated.  It is not necessary to formulate and solve 
the problem as an integrated whole.  The motor design results give additional 
examples of separations and demonstrate the importance of choosing appropriate 
surrogate constraints and objective functions. 
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The proposal to use separations to evaluate design decision-making is in the spirit 
of research into using game theory concepts to represent design processes, including 
[82, 68, 48,49, 88].  Some separations correspond exactly to cooperative games, non-
cooperative games, and Stackelberg games.  However, separations are not limited to 
these special cases. The analysis of separations studies not only changes in the 
structure of the separation but also changes to the subproblems’ constraints and 
objectives; these are not taken as given. 
This perspective of engineering design is not in conflict with the use of concurrent 
engineering, in which cross-functional teams consider downstream issues (especially 
those related to manufacturing) throughout the entire design process.  The use of 
concurrent engineering creates a new separation by modifying the objectives and 
constraints used to make design decisions and by changing when decisions are made 
(e.g., some process design activities may be started earlier).  However, there is still a 
separation because the design process is still divided into different subproblems. 
Finally, we recognize that creating a separation that corresponds to a real product 
development process and analyzing its quality are difficult challenges.  We are still 
learning how to do both of these steps, and the results presented here are only the 
beginning of studying this approach.  Progress toward this goal will help us better 
understand and improve product development processes.   
In particular, the analysis of Section 4 assumed that there was no uncertainty in 
order to simplify the exposition.  Considering the expected utility of profit or 
changing other aspects of the original problem formulation would lead to different 




In this chapter exact and approximate separations were defined. We showed that 
some separations give near the optimum solutions, however we found that in some 
problems we exactly get the same solutions as original problem. We applied our 
approach to the well-known electric motor problem and showed that in different 
separations we get different results. For instance we showed that minimizing material 
cost with respect to certain constraints lead to minimum deviation from the original 
problem’s optimum solution. In the next chapter we discuss design of product 
families while competition exists in the market. We use separation to replace the 




Chapter 5: Optimizing a Product Family under Competition 
5.1 Product Family Design: Formulation 
This section presents the product family design problem that we consider.  There 
are two manufacturers (Players 1 and 2) whose product families will compete against 
each other in the marketplace. The marketplace comprises distinct and independent 
markets, and each player has one product in each market.  Player 1 designs and sells a 
family of products, numbered from 1 to .  Player 2’s products are numbered from 
 to .   
Both players design simultaneously.  The payoff for each player is their total sales 
(for all of their products).  The size of each of the markets is fixed, so any gain in 
sales by one manufacturer means an equivalent loss in sales by the other.  Both 
manufacturers want to maximize their total sales across all markets, but the sum of 
the total sales of the two manufacturers is constant.  This problem can be modeled as 
a zero-sum game.  We consider the problem from Player 1’s perspective and assume 
that Player 1 has already decided to create a product family using a product platform 
(thus he does not design his products independently).  Moreover, Player 1 has already 
identified the platform variables for this family.  However, we make no similar 
assumption about Player 2’s products because we assume Player 2 will produce the 
best design possible for each individual product.  In some sense this is the worst-case 
for Player 1 and is, therefore, a reasonable way for Player 1 to proceed. 
For modeling demand, there are various probabilistic choice models based on 
Discrete Choice Analysis (DCA).  In this work, we use the logit model for its 
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simplicity and capability to predict the demand of future product designs.  The utility 
value is based on product characteristics that can be related to engineering design.  
The logit model is used to determine the market share for each product in each 
market. The market share of product j depends upon , the mean utility of product 
, which measures the desirability of the product [56].  In this problem, a product’s 
utility depends upon its customer attributes, which do not include price.  As in a 
Cournot duopoly, we assume that the prices are externally fixed quantities [50].   
Let  be the size of market . Note that, in each market, there are only two 
products: products  and . For product  designed and sold by Player 1, let 
 be its market share and let   be its sales:  
                        (21) 
Let  be the total sales for Player 1’s product family, which is the sum of the 
individual product sales:    
                      (22) 
Let  be Player 1’s product family, let  be Player 2’s 
products, and let  be the set of feasible products for Player i.  Then, for , 
 depends upon  and  depends upon .  Player 1 needs to solve the 
following optimization problem: 
               (23) 
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5.2 Product Family Design: Solution Approach 
To solve this problem, we will first consider Player 2 and find a dominant strategy 
for Player 2.  This strategy yields more sales for Player 2 than any other strategy, no 
matter what Player 1 does.  (Note that a strategy for Player 1 is a choice of , and a 
strategy for Player 2 is a choice of .) 
Because Player 2 does not necessarily use a platform, Player 2’s dominant 
strategy is to find, for each market , the  that maximizes , which 
will maximize his sales in that market. Let  be the corresponding maximum 
product utility. 
Then, because Player 2 will follow his dominant strategy, we have the following 
objective function for Player 1: 
      (24) 
Thus, Player 1’s optimal strategy is to find  that maximizes .  Thus, we have 
separated the original problem into  subproblems that can be solved in two 
stages.  The first stage solves  subproblems to find Player 2’s products, which can 
be done in parallel.  The second stage finds  to maximize .   
5.3 Application  
5.3.1 Motor Design 
To illustrate this approach to product family design, we will use the universal 
electric motor family developed by Simpson [80].  The product family has ten 
products, each designed to produce a different torque.  Each motor has eight design 
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variables.  Following Simpson [80], six of these eight design variables will be used to 
define the product platform (as discussed above, the choice of the platform variables 
has been made already).  These variables will have the same values for all ten 
products.  Each product in the family will have unique values for the remaining two 
design variables.  Tables 8 and 9 show the platform design variables and product 
design variables with their bounds. 
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Table 10. Torque Requirement Values. 
Market   
1 0.05 200,000 
2 0.10 250,000 
3 0.125 200,000 
4 0.15 100,000 
5 0.20 100,000 
6 0.25 50,000 
7 0.30 25,000 
8 0.35 25,000 
9 0.40 25,000 
10 0.50 25,000 
 
Because the product family has ten products, there will be ten sets of  and , 
which yields twenty design variables.  These plus the six platform design variables 
give a total 26 design variables.   
The four customer attributes are the torque  (in Nm), the power  (in watts), 
the efficiency , and the mass  (in kg).  They are calculated from the design 
variables and the engineering attributes as follows: 
    (25) 
All of the products should have a power of 300 watts.  The ten different torque 
requirements, which define the ten independent markets, are shown in Table 10.   
Because the power and torque must meet specific requirements dictated by the 
marketplace and the prices are fixed, we assume that the mean utility for each product 
depends only upon its mass and efficiency: 
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     (26) 
As discussed in the previous section, Player 1 can maximize his sales by solving 
the following optimization problem: 
            (27) 
 subject to      
          
 For this application, we can further simplify the problem by eliminating the 
product design variables as follows.  Given values for the platform design variables, it 
is possible to find values for  and  so that product j satisfies the power constraint 
 = 300 and the torque requirement  for that product .  (In the following we will 
drop the subscripts for convenience.) 
To do this, we first determine  as a function of the torque requirement:  
                   (28) 




   (29) 
The last of these equations can be rewritten to express  in terms of : 
      (30) 
Now we consider power, which is the difference between input power and output 
power:  
      (31) 
Using the relationships for  and  from Appendix A, we can derive the following 
expression: 
    (32) 
After including the definitions of  and  from Appendix A and defining the 
quantities , , , and  (all of which depend only upon the platform design 
variables), we have an expression for power in terms of  and : 
    (33) 
   (34) 
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Because P = 300, substituting Equation (33) into Equation (34) yields a quadratic 
function of : 
    (35) 
Solving this expression will give us two values for . We use the smaller value 
because the larger value exceeds the upper bound on .  From this value of I, we can 
determine L using Equation 30.  This procedure can be used to determine the design 
variables for each of the ten products in the product family.  Therefore, it is not 
necessary to include the product design variables in the search to solve the 
optimization problem, which can be reformulated as a problem with just the six 
platform design variables. 
Although Player 2 uses the same type of universal motor technology, we don’t make 
any assumptions about Player 2’s platform.  The best that Player 2 can do is to design 
independent products, one for each torque requirement, with no platform design 
variables.  Thus, to find Player 2’s dominant strategy, we separate the problem into 
ten parallel problems, one for each of the ten products.  The objective of each 
problem is to maximize the mean utility  subject to the power 
and torque constraints. 
5.3.1.1 Results 
First we considered Player 2’s problem.  For each torque requirement we found 
values for all eight design variables to maximize the product utility (cf. [61]).  
Appendix B.2 lists the values of the design variables and customer attributes for 
Player 2’s products.  (Again, the power equals 300 watts for all of the designs.) 
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Then we considered Player 1’s product family design problem. In this problem we 
propose two approaches. In the first approach we optimize  (Equation 27) using the 
markets shown in Table 10. The optimization problem was solved ten times using ten 
different initial points for the platform design variables (listed in Appendix B).  All 
ten runs yielded the same values for the platform design variables (these are shown in 
Table 11).  
From these values, the ten torque requirements, and the power constraint, we 
determined values for the product design variables using the procedure presented in 
the previous section.  Table 12 shows the values of the product design variables and 
the customer attributes for the ten products.  (Recall that the power equals 300 watts 
for all of the designs.)  We will call this set of products Family A. 
Given these solutions and a market size of 1,000,000, we determined the sales of each 
player (shown in Table 13).  As expected, Player 2’s sales are slightly higher.  
However, it is interesting to note that the difference is less than 4,000 units, which 
shows that, by adopting a product platform, Player 1 does not give up much in terms 
of sales. 
In the second approach we solve a different subproblem to find the product platform.  
We replace the original objective function (total sales) with the following quantity: 
 (36) 
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Table 12. Player 1’s Product Designs and Customer Attribute Values for each 
Torque Value for Family A. 
Torque     
0.05 2.9234 0.0037 0.1661 0.8923 
0.10 3.0076 0.0071 0.2118 0.8674 
0.125 3.0498 0.0087 0.2327 0.8553 
0.15 3.0922 0.0101 0.2524 0.8436 
0.2 3.1771 0.0128 0.2886 0.8211 
0.25 3.2625 0.0152 0.3208 0.7996 
0.3 3.3482 0.0152 0.3495 0.7791 
0.35 3.4344 0.0192 0.3751 0.7596 
0.4 3.5209 0.0209 0.3979 0.7409 
0.5 3.6953 0.0237 0.4360 0.7059 
Table 13. Total Sales for Each Player 





This optimization problem was solved ten times using ten different initial points for 
the platform design variables (listed in Appendix B).  This generated ten different 
solutions, but seven of them had the same objective function value.  Table 14 shows 
one of the best solutions found.  
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Given this product platform, for each torque, we calculated the appropriate values for 
and . Table 15 lists the values of and  and the customer attributes for each 
product.  (Recall that the power equals 300 watts for all of the designs.) We will call 
this set of products Family B. 
Because Family B is different from Family A, the total sales for Player 1 (across all 
ten markets) is different (and smaller). Player 2 still uses the product family shown in 
Table 11. Table 16 shows the total sales for each player. 
Table 14 compares the sales in each market for each family. As shown, the products 
in Family A have larger market shares (compared to those of Family B) in the larger 
markets (those with a torque requirement of 0.05, 0.10, and 0.125).  Although Family 
B has more sales in some smaller markets, Family A has greater total sales.  
Interestingly, the difference in total sales is small, indicating that using a simpler 
objective function to determine the product platform variables is a good heuristic. 
Figure 4 shows the mass and efficiency of each product in each family. Although 
customers want high efficiency, low mass products, there is a tradeoff to achieve this 
customer requirement.  For a given power and torque, high-efficiency motors require 





Figure 4.  The mass and efficiency tradeoff when power = 300 W and torque = 0.05 Nm. 
 Player 1’s high-torque products have higher mass and slightly lower efficiency than 
Player 2’s high-torque products. The mass and efficiency of the players’ medium-
torque products are very close.  Player 1’s low-torque products have slightly lower 
mass but lower efficiency than Player 2’s low-torque products. 
Table 14. Player 1’s Product Platform (Family B). 
      




Table 15. Player 1’s Product Designs and Customer Attribute Values for each 
Torque Value for Family B. 
Torque     
0.05 2.9525 0.0036 0.1745 0.8835 
0.10 3.0293 0.0068 0.2142 0.8612 
0.125 3.0678 0.0083 0.2325 0.8503 
0.15 3.1065 0.0097 0.2499 0.8398 
0.2 3.1840 0.0123 0.2821 0.8193 
0.25 3.2620 0.0147 0.3110 0.7997 
0.3 3.3403 0.0168 0.3371 0.7810 
0.35 3.4190 0.0187 0.3606 0.7630 
0.4 3.4982 0.0204 0.3817 0.7457 
0.5 3.6577 0.0233 0.4177 0.7132 
Table 16. Total Sales when Player 1 uses Family B. 
Product Family Sales 
Player1 497,684 
Player2 502,316 








1 99,468 98,818 
2 125,000 124,538 
3 100,022 99,778 
4 49,993 49,929 
5 49,915 49,951 
6 24,895 24,958 
7 12,412 12,462 
8 12,376 12,443 
9 12,340 12,420 
10 12,276 12,378 






Figure 5.  The mass and efficiency of each player’s products. 
 
5.3.1.2 Discussion: Product Family Design Process 
The analysis of the product family design problem and the results from the motor 
design example show that a design optimization problem that initially appears to be 
quite complex can be solved by replacing it with an appropriate set of subproblems, 
which we call a separation [61].  Unlike decomposition-based design optimization, 
which requires multiple iterations to converge to a solution, each subproblem in the 
separation is solved only once. In this section we propose two approaches to solve the 
problem. In the first approach we try to maximize total sales for our products based 
on competitor’s best design.   
In the second approach however instead of maximizing total sales ( ), we maximize 
a simpler intermediate quantity (the quantity X) that is sufficient to identify a 
dominant strategy. This leads to a suboptimal solution, but the separation requires less 
effort because it ignores Player 2. In the motor design example, we can eliminate the 
product design variables from the problem for Player 1 and solve to find just the 
platform design variables, which reduces the size of the search space.  Finally, for 
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Player 2, we separate his problem into ten subproblems, one for each of his products.  
Using this separation, we get an exact optimal solution to the original problem.  This 
is not always the case, unfortunately.  
5.4 Summary 
 In this chapter we used game theory to model market competition to solve 
product family design problems. We divided the market in different segments and 
showed that losing profit for one manufacturer causes gaining profit for the other. We 
replaced the problem of maximizing the total sales with a surrogate function and 
showed that our separation gives exact results as our original problem. We showed 
that using game theory can be a good approach to model competition and as we 
showed in our electric motor example Player 1 could able to compete with Player 2 





Chapter 6: Optimizing the Profitability of a Product Design 
under Competition 
In this section we consider the problem of designing a product with the 
objective of maximizing profit when the competition’s product is not yet known 
because the competitor is simultaneously designing its product and setting its price. 
We formulate the problem as a mixed-motive (i.e., non-zero-sum) two-player game 
and present an approach that finds the optimal product design. We find an exact 
separation that first optimizes the product design and then finds the equilibrium point 
of a mixed-motive two-player game to determine the optimal prices for both firms.  
We apply the approach to a motor design example and consider the impact of changes 
to the competitor’s cost model. As mentioned before, in a mixed motive game, unlike 
a zero-sum (or constant sum) game, the gain of one player does not necessarily equal 
the loss of the other (for a given combination of the players’ choices).   
6.1 Problem Formulation 
This section formulates the problem of optimal product design under 
competition.  There are two firms, whom we call “Player 1” and “Player 2”.  First, we 
will define the following notation: 
 = Price for Player i 
 = Performance of Player i’s product; this is constrained to the range . 
 = Unit cost of Player ’s product as a function of product performance.   
 = Desirability of the Player i’s product. 
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 = Profit for Player i. 
S = Total market size (S > 0). 
We assume that  is a strictly increasing function of  over  and 
that  for all values of .   
For modeling demand, there are various probabilistic choice models based on 
the Discrete Choice Analysis (DCA).  In this work, we use the logit model for its 
simplicity and capability to predict the demand of future product designs.  The utility 
value is based on product characteristics that can be related to engineering design. 
Like [58], we formulate the utility function in terms of observable characteristics to 
model the entire market, not individual preferences.  Although there exist many 
possible forms for the utility function, this study, like other studies in this area, 
assumes that the product’s utility is a linear function of its price and key product 
attributes (cf. [14, 16]).  We will define product performance as the total utility 
associated with the product attributes.  (See Section 5 for an example.)  Then, the 
product’s utility is the difference between its performance and its price (multiplied by 
the appropriate parameter) and express its desirability as follows: 
  (44) 
We use the logit model to estimate each player’s sales.  Each firm’s profit depends 
upon the net revenue and sales: 
  (45) 
Both firms seek to set  and  in order to maximize their own profit subject 
to , , and . 
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We exclude fixed costs from this formulation because we assume that changes 
to the design cause insignificant changes to the fixed costs.  Thus, they are essentially 
constant and can be ignored in this analysis.  Future work will have to analyze the 
problem with significant fixed costs that vary greatly as a function of the design. 
6.2 Solution Approach 
In order to analyze this two-player mixed-motive game, we will first find a set 
of non-dominated strategies for each player.  Let  be the profit per unit sold for 
Player i.  For a value of  > 0, consider the set of strategies ( , ) for Player i that 
all have a profit per unit of : 
  (46) 
To find the non-dominated strategy in this set, we will focus on Player 1 and then 
apply the results to Player 2. 
Theorem 1. Given  and two strategies  and that satisfy 
,   if and only if 
. 
Proof. Let .  Then   
if and only if  
    (47) 
Because S > 0 and , this is true if and only if 
    (48) 
Because  is always positive, this is true if and only if 
61 
  
  (49) 
This is equivalent to the following: 
  (50) 
  (51) 
  (52) 
Q.E.D. 
This theorem (when applied to both firms) implies that the non-dominated 
strategies for Player i include  that maximizes .  Let  be the vector of 
design variables for Player i’s product such that  and 
 is the unit cost function.  Finding  is equivalent to 
finding  that maximizes .   
Thus, Player 1 should find his optimal design, Player 2 should find his optimal 
design, and then they should determine prices that maximize each one’s profit.  This 
is also a mixed-motive two-player game, but it is simpler than the original problem 
because each player now has only one variable. 
Suppose that Player  has found .  Player  chooses price , which 
determines the price and profit: 
  (53) 
  (54) 
In order to calculate the Nash equilibrium we have to get first order derivative 
with respect to . 
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  (55) 
  (56) 
  (57) 
To find the Nash equilibrium, we find  and  such that  
  (58) 
These conditions (shown in Figure 1) are equivalent to the following: 
  (59) 
This system of equations has a unique solution, so there is a unique Nash 
equilibrium, and this is a non-dominated strategy.  To find the solution, let 
 for i = 1 and 2, find  such that 
, and set 
.  Then, the prices  and  can be determined. 
6.3 Separation 
The solution approach described in Section 6.2 is an exact separation [61].  It 
replaces the large scale design optimization problem with a set of subproblems, 
solves each subproblem once, and produces a feasible solution without iterative 
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cycles.  Each firm seeks to maximize its profit, which depends upon its product’s 
price and performance and the decisions of the other firm.  Finding the set of non-
dominated strategies allows each firm to solve a simpler problem first.  Namely, each 
firm must find  that maximizes , the difference between performance 
and cost.  After this step, each firm needs to set its price (represented by the surrogate 
variables  and ).  The solution to this simpler mixed-motive game gives the 
optimal price decisions for each firm. 
This separation of a complex design optimization problem into subproblems 
reduces the computational effort required to solve the problem.  Moreover, in this 
case, the separation provides an optimal solution to the original problem. 
This analysis depends upon the form of the desirability function.  Changing 
the desirability function will change the set of non-dominated strategies by changing 
the objective function that is used to find the optimal product design, but an exact 
separation is still possible. 
6.4 Example: Motor Design 
To illustrate the approach, we will consider the universal electric motor design 
optimization problem developed by Simpson [80].  The optimization model includes 
nine variables (eight design variables and the price), four customer attributes, twenty-
three intermediate engineering attributes, and seven fixed engineering parameters 
(described in Appendix A).  Table 18 lists the design variables, their lower and upper 







Table 18: Bounds on Design Variables. 
Variable Definition Lower bound 
Upper 
bound units 
 Turns of wire (armature) 100 1500 turns 
 
Turns of wire (stator), per pole 1 500 turns 
 
Cross sectional area 
of armature wire 0.01 1.0 mm
2 
 
Cross sectional area 
of stator wire 0.01 1.0 mm
2 
 
Outer radius (stator) 0.01 0.1 m 
 
Thickness (stator) 0.0005 0.01 m 
 Electric current 0.1 6 A 
 Stack length 0.01 0.2 m 
 
The four customer attributes are the torque T (in Nm), the power P (in watts), 
the efficiency η, and the mass M (in kg).  They are calculated from the design 
variables and the engineering attributes as follows: 
  (60) 
The motor should have a power of 300 watts and torque of 0.05 Nm.  The 
total market size S = 1,000,000.  The performance of the product depends upon these 
four attributes as follows:   
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  (61) 
Let  be the performance of Player i’s product, which is the sum of the four 
attribute’s performance: 
  (62) 
The unit cost of a product (which includes labor and other processing costs) is 
proportional to the unit material cost.  Let  be the cost coefficient of Player i’s 
product.  The unit cost function depends upon the mass and material cost of each 
component of the motor: 
  (63) 
For Player 1, following our previous work [57], we assume that 10/7.  
For Player 2, we consider different values of  in order to evaluate the impact of 
changes to that firm’s cost structure.  For both players, we assume three different 
price parameters for player 1 to evaluate our desirability model. We assume price 
parameter  while . We realized increasing price parameter will 
decrease player 1’s profit because weight of cost function increases and player 1 
decreases its price in order to compete with other player which leads to lower profit. 
Results are shown in Tables 18-20. 
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6.5 Experimental Results 
First we determined the best design for Player 1.  The optimization problem, 
which maximizes , was solved ten times with ten different initial 
points.  This was repeated for each value of . We kept the solutions (shown in 
Table 19) that gave the best value of objective function.   
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Table 19: Best Designs for Player 1 for different price parameters.  
              
                                 I     L 
0.5 623.3301 295.0772 0.1447 0.1447 0.0100 0.0044 3.1721 0.0100 
1.0 589.1725 275.1006 0.1092 0.1092 0.0100 0.0044 3.3863 0.0100 
2.0 623.2663 242.8017 0.0821 0.0821 0.0100 0.0050 3.7331 0.0100 
 
For Player 2 we solved the optimization problem with three different cost 
coefficients.  (Again, ten different initial points were used to solve each problem.)  
For each cost coefficient, we kept the best design found.  These solutions are shown 
in Table 20. 
Table 20: Best Designs for Player 2 for different cost coefficients.  
              
                                  I      L 
1.5 562.0179 262.4602 0.0942 0.0942 0.0100 0.0044 3.5424 0.0100 
2.0 585.5484 273.4140 0.1069 0.1069 0.0100 0.0044 3.4064 0.0100 
2.5 540.9784 252.6670 0.0851 0.0851 0.0100 0.0044 3.6733 0.0100 
 
The next step is to solve the mixed-motive two-player game by finding the 
Nash equilibrium, which required finding  and .  We then verified that the 
solution was a Nash equilibrium by checking that the second derivatives were 
negative, as shown in Tables 24-26.  We did this for each of the three cost 
coefficients. Tables 21, 22, and 23 show the results for both firms. In the scenarios 
with the larger unit cost for the second firm’s product, the second firm’s sales and 
profit are lower. 
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Table 21: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Cost 
Coefficients.  
Cost 
Coefficient Nash equilibrium Price ($)   Market Share (%)    Profit ($) 
                            Player 1 Player 2          
1.5 4.0754 1.9637 4.3072 2.1182 50.93 49.07 2,075,400 963,700 
2.0 4.1147 1.9458 4.3465 2.182 51.39 48.61 2,114,700 945,800 
2.5 4.1453 1.9323 4.3771 2.1629 51.75 48.25 2,145,300 932,600 
 
Table 22: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Cost 
Coefficients.  
Cost 
Coefficient Nash equilibrium Price ($)   Market Share (%)    Profit ($) 
                            Player 1 Player 2          
1.5 2.0037 1.9963 2.1764 2.1508 50.09 49.94 1,003,700 996,300 
2.0 2.0228 1.9777 2.1954 2.214 50.56 49.44 1,022,800 977,700 
2.5 2.0376 1.9638 2.2102 2.1944 50.92 49.08 1,037,600 963,800 
Table 23: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Cost 
Coefficients.  
Cost 
Coefficient Nash equilibrium Price ($)   Market Share (%)    Profit ($) 
                            Player 1 Player 2          
1.5 0.9777 2.0467 1.1055 2.2012 48.86 51.14 477,700 1,046,700 
2.0 0.9868 2.0272 1.1146 2.2635 49.33 50.67 486,800 1,027,200 
2.5 0.9938 2.0126 1.1216 2.2431 49.69 50.31 493,800 1,012,600 






1.5 -0.5187 -0.4907 
2.0 -0.5283 -0.4861 










1.5 -0.5009 -0.4991 
2.0 -0.5056 -0.4944 
2.5 -0.5092 -0.4908 






1.5 -0.4942 -0.5114 
2.0 -0.4966 -0.5067 
2.5 -0.4984 -0.5031 
6.6 Summary 
In this chapter we discussed the problem of designing a single product 
considering competition while different player’s strategies lead to different profit. We 
separated the problem of profit maximization into a set of subproblems. In the motor 
example we replaced the problem of maximizing the profit with value of the product 
which is the difference between performance and cost to reach that performance. 
Then we find Nash Equilibrium points to set the price in which none of the players 
want to deviate from that. We showed that cost coefficient affects profit. Higher cost 
coefficients lead to lower profit. In the next chapter we used mixed motive strategy to 
design family of products. 
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Chapter 7: Optimizing the Profitability of a Product Family 
under Competition 
7.1 Problem Description 
In this problem Player 1 is trying to design a family of products that will 
compete with a family of products from Player 2 in which each player is seeking to 
maximize his profits. We model this problem as a mixed motive game (instead of a 
zero-sum game) because the sum of the profits gained by the players is not constant. 
In order to design a product family Player 1 first should design a product platform 
and then derive product design variables for each individual product. In order to 
investigate Player 1’s optimal strategy, we first consider the worst case scenario that 
can happen to Player 1. The answer is in that scenario, Player 2 designs the best 
products that he can without a product platform. 
 
Figure 5. Product family in a competitive market. 
 
We will define the following notation: 
 = Price for Player 1’s Product i.  
 = Performance of Player 1’s Product i; this is constrained to the range . 
 = Unit cost of Player 1’s Product  as a function of product performance.   
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 = Desirability of the Player 1’s Product i. 
 = Profit for Player 1’s Product i. 
= Product i’s market size (S > 0). 
We assume that  is a strictly increasing function of  over  
and that  for all values of .   
The profit function can be expressed with equation 64.   
  (64) 
7.2 Solution Approach 
In order to solve the problem we separate the problem into three sets of 
subproblems. Figure 6 shows how we separate the all-at-once problem into sets of 
subproblems.  In the first set of subproblems Player 2 maximizes the performance of 
each of his products by maximizing  (  is number of products). The 
second set has just one subproblem.  In this subproblem Player 1 determines his 
product family design by maximizing the following sum: 
  (65) 
For each individual product, 





























Figure 6. Separating product family design.  This figure shows all of the subproblems. 
 
The third set of subproblems includes, for each product market, a mixed-motive game 
to find the optimal prices for both players’ products in that market.  We do this for 
each market independently of the others.  Players 1 and 2 have found 
 and  (i = 1, …, n; j = 1, 2).  Player j’s price for 
product i is , which determines Player j’s profit for this product as follows:  























  (68) 
In order to calculate the Nash equilibrium for market  we have to get the 
first-order derivative with respect to . 
  (69) 
  (70) 
  (71) 
To find the Nash equilibrium, we find  and  such that  
  (72) 
These conditions are equivalent to the following: 
  (73) 
Now, for j = 1 and 2, let ; these conditions imply that  
and .  They are equivalent to the following system of equations: 
 (74) 
Because the left-hand side of the first equation is strictly increasing and the right-
hand side is a constant independent of  and , there is a unique value  that 
solves this system of equations.  Consequently, there is also a unique value  that 
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can be determined from the second equation.  From  and , we can determine the 
optimal prices  and .  Because both  and  are positive, each player’s 
profit is positive at this point. 
This point is a Nash equilibrium.  That is, if Player j changes his price to any 
value not equal to , then his profit will decrease.  When , 
.  The first derivative  is positive if and only if 
, which is true if and only if .  
As  increases, the profit first increases until it reaches its maximum at , 
where the first derivative equals 0.  For ,  is negative.  As  
increases, the profit decreases and approaches 0.  In other words,  is 
strongly quasiconcave, and  is the unique global optimal solution. 
The set of strategies  is a Nash equilibrium for the 
original two-player game.  Because  is a Nash equilibrium to the two-player 
pricing game, we know that if either player changes only his price, that will decrease 
his profits.  Recall that .  As a result of Theorem 1, if Player j changes his 
design to  such that , then, for any price , his profit decreases 
because .   
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There may be multiple Nash equilibria if there are multiple designs for Player 
j that maximize .  In this case, because they all have the 
same value of , they all lead to same equilibrium prices and profits. 
Each design optimization subproblem (maximizing  subject to ) 
has one player’s design variables, and the effort required to solve it depends upon the 
properties of  and .  The pricing subproblem can be solved directly from 
(17).  
7.3 Application: Motor Design 
To illustrate this approach to product family design, we will use the universal electric 
motor family mentioned in Section 4.2. Player 2’s Best Products and Customer 
Attribute Values for each Torque Value are shown in Table B.2.  We will consider 
two different separations for this problem by changing the objective of Player 1’s 
product platform design optimization platform.  In the first separation, Player 1 seeks 
to .  In the second separation, Player 1 seeks to minimize the total material 
cost  . 
7.3.1 Results 
First we considered Player 2’s problem.  For each torque requirement we 
found values for all eight design variables to maximize the product utility (cf. [61]).  
Appendix B.2 lists the values of the design variables and customer attributes for 
Player 2’s products.  (Again, the power equals 300 watts for all of the designs.) 
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Then we considered Player 1’s product family design problem. In this problem we 
propose two approaches. In the first approach we try to maximize the value of the 
product family shown in equation (58). Then we find  and   by finding Nash 
Equilibrium points in order to find prices for each product in the family. The 
optimization problem was solved ten times using ten different initial points for the 
platform design variables (listed in Table B). We found based values for the product 
platform based on different values of price coefficients (  = 0.5, 1, 2). Table 27 
shows the best product platforms, Tables 27, 28 and 29 show the product family 
values, and Figures 7, 8, and 9 graph the mass and efficiency of the product families 
for  = 0.5, 1 and 2.  Tables 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, and 35 show the prices, product-
specific profits, and total profits for each player for the different values of the price 
coefficients.  We see that, as the price coefficient  increases, Player 1’s prices must 
decrease, and the firm’s total profits decrease.   
Table 27: Best Product Platform Designs for Player 1 for different price 
coefficients.  
              
                            
0.5 291.6347 320.4783 0.1921 0.1344 0.0166 0.0047 
1.0 194.3221 335.0022 0.1262 0.1924 0.0167 0.0033 




Table 28: Best Product Family Designs for Player 1 for =0.5.  
Torque     
0.05 3.3158 0.0085 0.1353 0.7867 
0.10 3.5681 0.0147 0.1907 0.7311 
0.125 3.6973 0.0171 0.2122 0.7056 
0.15 3.8288 0.0191 0.2304 0.6813 
0.2 4.0989 0.0222 0.2584 0.6364 
0.25 4.3795 0.0243 0.2773 0.5957 
0.3 4.6720 0.0257 0.2892 0.5584 
0.35 4.9779 0.0264 0.2956 0.5241 
0.4 5.2993 0.0266 0.2976 0.4923 
0.5 6.0000 0.0259 0.2916 0.4348 
 
 












Table 29: Best Product Family Designs for Player 1 for =1.  
Torque     
0.05 3.2671 0.0116 0.1807 0.7985 
0.10 3.5227 0.0200 0.2578 0.7405 
0.125 3.6533 0.0232 0.2877 0.7141 
0.15 3.7858 0.0260 0.3129 0.6891 
0.2 4.0570 0.0301 0.3514 0.6430 
0.25 4.3372 0.0330 0.3774 0.6015 
0.3 4.6274 0.0348 0.3939 0.5638 
0.35 4.9286 0.0357 0.4030 0.5293 
0.4 5.2422 0.0361 0.4064 0.4976 
0.5 5.9139 0.0355 0.4005 0.4411 
 
 












Table 30: Best Product Family Designs for Player 1 for =2.  
Torque     
0.05 3.5804 0.0040 0.2015 0.7286 
0.10 3.7766 0.0072 0.2617 0.6908 
0.125 3.8784 0.0085 0.2868 0.6726 
0.15 3.9829 0.0097 0.3089 0.6550 
0.2 4.2009 0.0116 0.3453 0.6210 
0.25 4.4331 0.0130 0.3721 0.5885 
0.3 4.6826 0.0140 0.3907 0.5571 
0.35 4.9538 0.0146 0.4019 0.5266 
0.4 5.2537 0.0148 0.4064 0.4965 
0.5 5.9978 0.0142 0.3949 0.4349 
 
 






Table 31: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Price 
Coefficients.  
Torque Nash equilibrium Price ($) Market Share (%) Profit ($) 
     Player 1 Player 2   
0.05 4.0517 1.9748 4.37 2.31 50.64 49.36 2,051,700 974,800 
0.10 4.0791 1.962 4.50 2.41 50.97 49.03 2,079,100 962,000 
0.125 5.7628 1.5315 6.22 2.03 65.29 34.71 3,762,800 531,500 
0.15 4.0971 1.9537 4.59 2.49 51.19 48.81 2,097,100 953,700 
0.2 4.1082 1.9487 4.65 2.54 51.32 48.68 2,108,200 948,700 
0.25 4.117 1.9448 4.69 2.59 51.42 48.58 2,117,000 944,800 
0.3 4.1325 1.9379 4.73 2.63 51.60 48.40 2,132,500 937,900 
0.35 4.1496 1.9304 4.76 2.66 51.80 48.20 2,149,600 930,400 
0.4 4.1614 1.9253 4.77 2.69 51.94 48.06 2,161,400 925,300 
0.5 4.197 1.9103 4.80 2.72 52.35 47.65 2,197,000 910,300 
Table 32: Total Profit for Each Player.   
Player Profit ($) 
1 22,856,400 
2 9,019,400 
Table 33: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Price 
Coefficients.  
Torque Nash equilibrium Price ($) Market Share (%) Profit ($) 
     Player 1 Player 2   
0.05 1.9368 2.0675 2.36 2.40 48.37 51.63 936,800 1,067,500 
0.10 1.917 2.0905 2.48 2.54 47.84 52.16 917,000 1,090,500 
0.125 2.661 1.602 3.28 2.10 62.42 37.58 1,661,000 602,000 
0.15 1.9022 2.1085 2.56 2.64 47.43 52.57 902,200 1,108,500 
0.2 1.8921 2.121 2.62 2.72 47.15 52.85 892,100 1,130,100 
0.25 1.8849 2.1301 2.66 2.78 46.95 53.05 884,900 1,130,100 
0.3 1.8853 2.1296 2.69 2.82 46.96 53.04 885,300 1,129,600 
0.35 1.8894 2.1244 2.71 2.86 47.07 52.93 889,400 1,124,400 
0.4 1.8924 2.1206 2.72 2.88 47.16 52.84 892,400 1,120,600 
0.5 1.9084 2.1008 2.73 2.91 47.60 52.40 908,400 1,100,800 
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Table 34: Total Profit for Each Player.  
Player Profit ($) 
1 9,769,500 
2 10,604,100 
Table 35: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Price 
Coefficients.  
Torque Nash equilibrium Price ($) Market Share (%) Profit ($) 
     Player 1 Player 2   
0.05 0.8723 2.3431 1.39 2.68 42.68 57.32 372,300 1,343,100 
0.10 0.861 2.3851 1.48 2.83 41.93 58.07 361,000 1,385,100 
0.125 1.1559 1.7624 1.81 2.26 56.74 43.26 655,900 762,400 
0.15 0.8512 2.4235 1.55 2.96 41.26 58.74 351,200 1,423,500 
0.2 0.8433 2.4563 1.60 3.05 40.71 59.29 343,300 1,456,300 
0.25 0.8375 2.4813 1.64 3.13 40.30 59.70 337,500 1,481,300 
0.3 0.8348 2.4936 1.66 3.19 40.10 59.90 334,800 1,493,600 
0.35 0.834 2.4968 1.68 3.23 40.05 59.95 334,000 1,496,800 
0.4 0.8347 2.4938 1.69 3.25 40.10 59.90 334,700 1,493,800 
0.5 0.8432 2.4567 1.68 3.27 40.71 59.29 343,200 1,456,700 
 
In the second separation, Player 1 seeks to minimize the material cost. The price 
coefficient does not affect the product platform design. The best product platform 
design variables are shown in Table 37. Table 38 shows the corresponding product 
designs, and Figure 10 shows the products’ mass and efficiency.  Note that the 
product mass is much lower than those of the product families found using the first 
separation.  Tables 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, and 44 show the prices, product-specific 
profits, and total profit for each player.  Again, as Player 1’s price coefficient 
increases, the firm must decrease their prices, which reduces their profits. 
 To compare the separations, we compare the profits of the product families for 
different values of the price coefficient. Tables 45, 46, 47, 48, 49 and 50 show the 
82 
  
change in profits for each product and for total profits.  The values reported are the 
profits found using the first separation minus the profits found using the second 
separation.  Thus, a positive difference indicates that the first separation found a more 
profitable product family.  Table 51 summarizes these results. 
Table 36: Total Profit for Each Player.   
Player Profit ($) 
1 3,767,900 
2 13,792,600 
Table 37: Best Product Platform Designs for Player 1 using the second 
separation.  
 
     
971.5294 56.2648 0.1494 0.1546 0.0100 0.0067 
Table 38: Best Product Family Designs for Player 1.  
Torque     
0.05 4.2227 0.0354 0.2022 0.6178 
0.10 5.7624 0.0380 0.2160 0.4527 
0.125 6.5562 0.0367 0.2091 0.3979 
0.15 7.3674 0.0348 0.1995 0.3541 
0.2 9.0467 0.0308 0.1782 0.2884 
0.25 10.8117 0.0270 0.1579 0.2413 
0.3 12.6772 0.0235 0.1398 0.2058 
0.35 14.6623 0.0205 0.1239 0.1779 
0.4 16.7938 0.0179 0.1099 0.1553 




Figure 10.  The mass and efficiency of each player’s products. 
 
Table 39: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Cost 
Coefficients.  
Torque Nash equilibrium Price ($) Market Share (%) Profit ($) 
     Player 1 Player 2   
0.05 3.868 2.0707 4.34 2.40 48.29 51.71 1,868,000 1,070,700 
0.10 3.859 2.0759 4.37 2.53 48.17 51.83 1,859,000 1,075,900 
0.125 5.4161 1.5855 5.91 2.08 63.07 36.93 3,416,100 585,500 
0.15 3.897 2.0543 4.36 2.59 48.68 51.32 1,897,000 1,054,300 
0.2 3.9403 2.0308 4.36 2.63 49.24 50.76 1,940,300 1,030,800 
0.25 3.9823 2.0089 4.35 2.65 49.78 50.22 1,982,300 1,008,900 
0.3 4.0319 1.9843 4.36 2.68 50.40 49.60 2,031,900 984,300 
0.35 4.0763 1.9632 4.37 2.7 50.94 49.06 2,076,300 963,200 
0.4 4.1103 1.9477 4.37 2.71 51.34 48.66 2,110,300 947,700 
0.5 4.1842 1.9157 4.39 2.73 52.20 47.80 2,184,200 915,700 
Table 40: Total Profit for Each Player.  






Table 41: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Cost Coefficients.  
 
Torque Nash equilibrium Price ($) Market Share (%) Profit ($) 
     Player 1 Player 2   
0.05 1.8625 2.1594 2.34 2.49 46.31 53.69 862,500 1,159,400 
0.10 1.8539 2.1711 2.36 2.62 46.06 53.94 853,900 1,171,100 
0.125 2.5828 1.6318 3.07 2.13 61.28 38.72 1,582,800 631,800 
0.15 1.8769 2.1404 2.34 2.67 46.72 53.28 876,900 1,140,400 
0.2 1.9041 2.106 2.32 2.70 47.48 52.52 904,100 1,106,000 
0.25 1.9308 2.0744 2.30 2.72 48.21 51.79 930,800 1,074,400 
0.3 1.9608 2.0408 2.29 2.73 49.00 51.00 960,800 1,040,800 
0.35 1.9878 2.0123 2.28 2.74 49.69 50.31 987,800 1,012,300 
0.4 2.0093 1.9908 2.27 2.75 50.23 49.77 1,009,300 990,800 
0.5 2.0542 1.9486 2.26 2.76 51.32 48.68 1,054,200 948,600 
Table 42: Total Profit for Each Player.   
Player Profit ($) 
1 10,023,100 
2 10,275,600 
Table 43: Prices and Profit for Both Firms for Different Cost Coefficients.  
 
Torque Nash equilibrium Price ($) Market Share (%) Profit ($) 
     Player 1 Player 2   
0.05 0.8686 2.3565 1.34 2.69 42.44 57.56 368,600 1,356,500 
0.10 0.8613 2.3839 1.37 2.83 41.95 58.05 361,300 1,383,900 
0.125 1.1762 1.7394 1.67 2.24 57.49 42.51 676,200 739,400 
0.15 0.8755 2.3316 1.34 2.87 42.89 57.11 375,500 1,331,600 
0.2 0.8931 2.2719 1.31 2.87 44.02 55.98 393,100 1,271,900 
0.25 0.9107 2.2174 1.28 2.86 45.10 54.90 410,700 1,217,400 
0.3 0.9298 2.1632 1.26 2.86 46.23 53.77 429,800 1,163,200 
0.35 0.9472 2.118 1.24 2.85 47.21 52.79 447,200 1,118,000 
0.4 0.9617 2.0829 1.22 2.84 48.01 51.99 461,700 1,082,900 
0.5 0.9912 2.018 1.20 2.83 49.55 50.45 491,200 1,018,000 
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Table 44: Total Profit for Each Player.   
Player Profit ($) 
1 4,415,300 
2 11,682,800 
Table 45: Profit Comparison between First and Second Approach.  
 
Torque Player 1 Player 2 
0.05 0.1871 -0.0975 
0.10 0.2235 -0.1155 
0.125 0.3529 -0.0549 
0.15 0.2031 -0.102 
0.2 0.1715 -0.0837 
0.25 0.1373 -0.0653 
0.3 0.105 -0.0484 
0.35 0.0779 -0.0348 
0.4 0.0543 -0.0237 
0.5 0.0162 -0.0068 
Table 46: Total Profit Difference for Each Player.   








Table 47: Profit Comparison between First and Second Approach.   
Torque Player 1 Player 2 
0.05 0.0625 -0.0783 
0.10 0.0525 -0.0679 
0.125 0.06 -0.0231 
0.15 0.0156 -0.0199 
0.2 -0.0227 0.0285 
0.25 -0.0555 0.0681 
0.3 -0.085 0.1011 
0.35 -0.1089 0.1255 
0.4 -0.1271 0.1428 
0.5 -0.1546 0.163 
Table 48: Total Profit Difference for Each Player.   





Table 49: Profit Comparison between First and Second Approach.   
Torque Player 1 Player 2 
0.05 0.022 -0.0763 
0.10 0.0167 -0.0612 
0.125 0.0085 -0.0091 
0.15 -0.0087 0.0314 
0.2 -0.0356 0.1266 
0.25 -0.0602 0.209 
0.3 -0.0828 0.2778 
0.35 -0.1021 0.3309 
0.4 -0.1175 0.3697 




Table 50: Total Profit Difference for Each Player.   





Table 51: Total Profit for Each Player and Change in Profit due to Change in 
Separation. 
 Player Separation 1 Separation 2 Difference 
1 22,856,400 21,365,400 1,491,000 
0.5,1 
2 9,019,400 9,637,000 -617,600 
1 9,769,500 10,023,100 -253,600 
1,1 
2 10,604,100 10,275,600 328,500 
1 3,767,900 4,415,300 -647,400 
2,1 
2 13,792,600 11,682,800 2,109,800 
7.3.2 Discussion: Product Family Design with Mixed Motive Strategy 
The analysis of the product family design problem and the results from the 
motor design example show that competition between manufacturers is an important 
issue for designers to consider while designing their products. As shown in Tables 31, 
33, and 35, Player 1’s market share and total profit decreased as Player 1’s price 
coefficient increased. Player 1’s reaction to profit loss is to decrease the price in order 
to keep up with the competition. As the price coefficient increases, the need to design 
lighter products (product with less material cost) decreases. Tables 28, 29 and 30 
show increase in product mass. As product torque increases throughout the family 
there is a need to design longer rotor to produce higher current for motor rotation. For 
this reason increasing torque will increase mass of the product.  
As shown in Figures 8, 9, and 10, Player 1 sacrifices mass and efficiency of the 
products in order to compete with Player 2 and although these customer requirements 
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in Player 1’s product are worse than Player 2, it still does not give up the competition. 
As shown in Tables 31, 33, 35, 39, 41, and 43, as price coefficient increases; 
efficiency of the product drops due to increasing current throughout the family. In the 
second separation Player 1 seeks to minimize the material cost in order to maximize 
profit. In this approach Player 1’s market share and total profit decreases and we see 
profit loss as the price coefficient increases. Figure 11 however shows that the second 
separation minimizes mass, but at the same time the efficiency of the products drops 
dramatically. We calculated the profit difference between first and second approach 
to compare different approaches. Results are shown in Table 24, 26 and 30. 
   (68) 
The first separation gives better results for Player 1 in most market segments. Total 
profit is only higher in  scenario in the first separation. The second 
separation reduces product mass, which is correlated with product cost.  This 
separation shows better total profits when  = 1 and 2 because the price is more 
important to the customer. In the second separation Player 2 performs better in terms 
of total profit. As shown in Figure 11, Player 1’s products can not compete with the 
other player with respect to efficiency and Player 1’s product mass and efficiencies 
are much worse than Player 2. This gives us some conclusions that the second 
separation sacrifices product performance in order to compete with the other 
manufacturer. While separation 1 performs better when customers care less about 
price, when the price coefficient increases (that is, customers care more about price) 




 In this chapter we studied mixed motive strategy to investigate the effect of 
different strategies on product family design. We considered a two player game in 
which one player adapts a platform and still compete with the other player which 
designs the best for each product in the family. We separated the problem into a set of 
subproblems and replaced the problem of maximizing the profit with a surrogate 
function that maximized the value of the whole family to set product platform 
variables first and then we find Nash Equilibrium point to set the price.  The example 
showed that the relative quality of different separations can depend upon customer 
preferences (in this case, the relative importance of performance and price).  
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Chapter 8: Summary and Conclusions  
This chapter summarizes the results of this dissertation, discusses the 
contributions of the work, and presents ideas for future work.  
8.1 Summary of Research Results 
This dissertation studied product design and product family design optimization 
problems in the presence of competition.  In order to solve these problems, we 
developed a new approach for solving design optimization problems.  We defined 
“separation” and distinguished it from decomposition-based design optimization, 
Analytical Target Cascading and all-at-once techniques, which can be 
computationally extensive and expensive due to iterative nature of the algorithms. A 
separation replaces a large, complex subproblem with a series of subproblems and 
solves each subproblem once and sequentially.  Separation provides a different way 
to find solutions to design optimization problems.  However, a separation must be 
carefully designed to provide a valuable solution.  Our results showed that the quality 
of approximate separations depends upon the constraints and objectives used in the 
subproblems.   
This dissertation studied four product design and product family design problems. 
We first studied the problem of maximizing profit without competition. Our 
formulation followed the decision-based design framework for product design.  We 
showed that the problem can be separated to solve it faster and easier. We used the 
universal electric motor problem to illustrate this approach and showed that focusing 
on certain customer requirements lead to better results. A separation that optimized 
91 
  
the product attributes first and then set the design variables to minimize the deviation 
from those targets led to a more profitable design than other approximate separations. 
In the second problem we considered the problem of maximizing profit with the 
existence of competition. Our analysis of the problem identified a set of non-
dominated strategies. We then replaced the original mixed-motive two-player game 
(which included the design and price variables for each firm) with an exact separation 
that has three subproblems.  The first two subproblems, which can be solved in 
parallel, find the optimal design for each firm by maximizing the value of the product.  
The third sets the optimal prices for both firms in order to maximize their profits.  
The third problem that we considered was the problem of maximizing the sales 
for a family of products in a two-firm market.   We formulated the problem as a two-
player zero-sum game and found dominant strategies for each player.  We constructed 
an exact separation in which Player 2 designs each of his products and then Player 1 
designs a product family that maximizes his sales. 
In the fourth problem, the two firms are designing product families and seek to 
maximize their profit.  We constructed an approximate separation that has three sets 
of subproblems.  First, Player 2 designs each of his products.  Then, Player 1 designs 
a product family.  Finally, we have to set optimal prices for both players in each 
market.  We compared the performance of two different approximate separations to 
the motor product family design problem.  The separations’ relative performance 
depended upon the customer preferences about product performance and price.  
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For all of these problems, we developed a separation that can be used as to solve 
the problem in general and also illustrated the solution approach by using the motor 
design problem as an example. 
8.2 Contributions and Limitations 
This dissertation makes two types of contributions.  First, it presents a new way to 
solve large design optimization problems.  Separations can solve large, complex 
problems easier. It is more efficient, needs less computations and iterations are 
eliminated due to the sequential nature of the process.  
From a methodological perspective, we contribute to the literature by proposing 
and testing a new approach to solve design optimization problems.  Because it avoids 
iteration of decomposition, a separation may reduce the time needed to find a feasible 
solution, which could be useful when development time is limited and the designer is 
willing to accept a suboptimal, feasible design.  Such a separation is helpful.  
However, a separation that fails to find a feasible solution must be replaced with a 
better separation. 
The dissertation demonstrates the usefulness of separation by separating product 
design and product family design problems with competition.  We showed that 
product design can be separated into subproblems of designing and pricing of the 
product separately in order to maximize sales or profit. 
Second, this dissertation contributes to the literature on product design 
optimization by studying new problems not previously considered.  In particular, we 
considered problems in which a firm must both design and price a new product or 
product family while the competition is simultaneously doing the same thing.  This 
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led to game-theoretic models of product design unlike those used in previous work to 
model collaborative design.  In this work, the players in the game are directly 
competing against each other. 
This dissertation has studied only some of the problems that can occur in the area 
of design for market systems.  It has not addressed problems with different 
distribution channels like those discussed in Williams et al. [16].   
Clearly, the consideration of problems with only two players is limited.  The 
problems studied here do not cover situations with more than two firms competing in 
the marketplace.  In addition, these problems do not cover leader-follower scenarios. 
Because the demand models assume that the markets for different products in the 
product family are completely distinct, they may be invalid in cases where consumers 
will choose among different product sectors. 
8.3 Future Work 
In this dissertation, we studied the separation of product family design problems 
with and without competition. Areas for future work include separating reliability-
based design optimization problems, robust optimization problems, and separating 
multi-objective, multidisciplinary optimization problems. Examples in designing 
large, complex systems such as ships, aircrafts can be investigated to illustrate these 
approaches and other future extensions of separation. Design of these large, complex 
systems can be separated into smaller subproblems throughout the design process. 
Also we need to address guidelines on how to separate design optimization problems, 






Appendix A. Engineering Parameters and Attributes  
Engineering Parameters 
Length of air gap  = 7.0 10-4  
Terminal voltage  = 115  
Resistivity of copper = 1.69 10-8  
Permeability of free space  = 4 10-7  
Number of stator poles  = 2 
Cost of copper  = 2.2051  
Cost of steel  = 0.882  
Density of copper  = 8,960  
Density of steel  = 7,861.09  
Engineering Attributes 
Magnetizing intensity [Ampere turns/ ]   
Mean path length within the stator [ ]   
Diameter of armature [ ]   
Input power [ ]   
Power losses due to copper and brushes [ ]   
Armature wire length [ ]   
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Stator wire length [ ]   
Armature wire resistance [ ]   
Stator wire resistance [ ]   
Mass windings [ ]   
Mass of stator [ ]   
Mass of armature [ ]   
Motor constant [dimensionless]   
Magneto magnetic force [A turns]   
Magnetic flux [ ]   
Total reluctance [A turns/ ]   
Stator reluctance [A turns/ ]   
Armature reluctance [A turns/ ]   
Reluctance of one air gap [A turns/ ]   
Cross sectional area of stator [ ]   
Cross sectional area of armature [ ]   
Cross sectional area of air gap [ ]   




Appendix B.  Initial Designs 
Table B.1: Initial designs for Separations S1 and S2. 
      
622.4461 10.2789 0.1798 0.0855 0.0296 0.0087 
971.5237 41.0603 0.1669 0.2469 0.0299 0.0036 
622.4460 10.2836 0.2004 0.1590 0.0294 0.0051 
971.4546 52.0387 0.2522 0.9947 0.0113 0.0021 
373.0639 21.7458 0.2813 1 0.0159 0.0008 
971.5356 48.7206 0.2976 0.9760 0.0142 0.0025 
383.8721 33.1335 0.2371 1 0.0103 0.0005 
971.5287 56.2628 0.2115 0.2162 0.0123 0.0013 
483.5892 223.6510 0.0644 1 0.0243 0.0005 
970.7074 128.5235 0.2849 0.2776 0.0181 0.0098 
 
Table B.2: Player 2’s Best Products and Customer Attribute Values for each 
Torque Value. 
 
Torque           
0.05 624.4289 331.9046 0.2936 0.2936 0.0100 0.0040 2.8878 0.0100 0.167 0.9034 
0.10 970.0895 441.3717 0.2955 0.2955 0.0100 0.0046 2.9927 0.0100 0.2203 0.8717 
0.125 1045.8406 488.0866 0.2951 0.2951 0.0100 0.0044 0.0389 0.0100 0.2399 0.8584 
0.15 1142.0968 500 0.2937 0.2937 0.0100 0.0042 3.0842 0.0100 0.2562 0.8458 
0.2 1207.8453 500 0.2921 0.2921 0.0100 0.0037 3.1682 0.0109 0.2863 0.8234 
0.25 1240.4244 500 0.2909 0.2909 0.0100 0.0034 3.2466 0.0119 0.3118 0.8035 
0.3 1273.7696 500 0.2896 0.2897 0.0100 0.0031 3.3230 0.0128 0.3331 0.785 
0.35 1306.6778 500 0.2884 0.2884 0.0100 0.0029 3.3984 0.0136 0.3513 0.7676 
0.4 1338.0306 500 0.2870 0.2870 0.0100 0.0028 3.4735 0.0142 0.3669 0.751 
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